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CASE COMMENTS
Attorney Discipline-ATTORNEY MAY BE PUNISHED FOR CHARGING
EXCESSIVE FEE ABSENT AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES, FRAUD, OR Dis-
HONESTY.-The Florida Bar v. Moriber, 314 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 1975).
Attorney Leonard Moriber entered into a written employment
agreement with Theodore Pietz, which provided that Moriber was
to collect all sums due Pietz as sole beneficiary of his mother's estate
and was to receive one-third of the gross recovery if settled without
suit, or 40 percent if suit was filed. Moriber wrote approximately
seven letters, completed a few forms, made some telephone calls, and
collected $23,126.10 from mutual trust funds and $823.31 from three
other sources. He calculated his fee and advised his client by letter
that he would forward $13,468.05 to him upon execution by Pietz of
a general release in favor of Moriber.1 Thereafter, the Florida Bar
filed a complaint against Moriber.2 After a hearing, a referee found it
improper for Moriber to demand the execution of a contingency
agreement under the circumstances of the case. Nevertheless, the
referee recommended discipline by the court only if Moriber failed to
reimburse the difference between $2,500, which the referee deter-
mined was a reasonable fee 3 and the $7,983.14 which Moriber had
originally charged. 4 When Moriber failed to reimburse his client, the
referee made an additional recommendation of prohibition from
practicing law for 45 days. 5 Moriber still refused to repay the money
to Pietz and the referee recommended that Moriber be suspended for
45 days. The Supreme Court of Florida, sua sponte, called for briefs
from both sides; 6 in its unprecedented decision of April 9, 1975, the
1. The Florida Bar v. Moriber, 314 So. 2d at 146-47.
2. A complaint is filed by the Florida Bar upon a finding by either a grievance
committee or the Board of Governors of the Bar that probable cause exists to believe
an accused is guilty of misconduct. A referee is appointed to try the matter in a "quasi-
judicial administrative proceeding." A referee's report which contains a finding of
guilt and a recommendation of public punishment is filed in the Florida Supreme Court,
subject to review by either party. INTEGRATION RULE OF THE FLORIDA BAR 11.05, 11.06,
32 FLA. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1975-76).
3. Moriber desired that the proceedings be confidential; he requested that no other
attorneys testify as to the reasonableness of the fees. It was agreed by Moriber and the
Florida Bar that the referee would determine the reasonableness of the fee. Report
of Referee, filed in the Supreme Court Feb. 8, 1974, at 5.
4. 314 So. 2d at 147-48.
5. Id. at 148.
6. See note 2 supra. Rule 11.09(3)( 0 provides that the referee's recommendation of
punishment will be adopted by the court unless the court directs the parties to submit
briefs or arguments as to the suitability of the referee's recommendation. INTEGRATION
RULE OF THE FLORIDA BAR 11.09(3)(0, 32 FLA. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1975-76).
CASE COMMENTS
court suspended Moriber from the practice of law for the sole offense
of charging an excessive fee. It held that the fee charged was not
merely excessive, but "was so 'clearly excessive' as to constitute a viola-
tion of DR [Disciplinary Rule] 2-106 . . .
Although the court's action was well within the confines of its
discretion," the decision raised questions regarding the freedom of
lawyers to contract with their clients, the propriety of contingency
fees, and standards for judicial review of attorneys' fees. These three
issues are part of the larger question of the court's power to interfere
with the private dealings of attorneys and clients, and to discipline
members of the bar.
The notion that the practice of law is not a business venture, but
a privilege which may be revoked, is not a modem development.9
The Supreme Court of Florida first addressed the issue of its power
to discipline state attorneys in the 1868-69 term, 10 and cited the 1275
Statute of Westminster as its authority." Later, the court noted that
the quotation from the Statute of Westminster was incomplete,12
but that the thrust of the original language was not diminished by
the omission . 3 In 1930, the court observed that the power to discipline
attorneys "did not exist in the courts at common law, and did not
come definitely into existence as a court function until the statute of 4
7. 314 So. 2d at 149.
8. There is generally no prescribed discipline for any particular type of improper
conduct. The disciplinary measures taken are discretionary with the courts, which
may disbar, suspend, or merely censure the attorney as the nature of the offense
and past indicia of character may warrant.
Note, Disbarment: Non-Professional Conduct Demonstrating Unfitness to Practice, 43
CORNELL L. REv. 489, 495 (1958) (footnote omitted).
9. 'When . . . the Bar had become a profession we find that the praetor or
provincial governor could suspend a particular advocate from practice in his
court either temporarily or permanently: but it had not yet reached this stage
in Cicero's time ....'
Cohen, The Origins of the English Bar, 30 L. Q. REv. 464 (1914) (citation omitted).
omitted).
10. State ex rel. Wolfe v. Kirke, 12 Fla. 278 (1868-69 Term).
11. Statute of Westminster, the First, 3 Edw. I, c. 29 (1275). See note 13 infra for
text of the statute.
12. Application of Harper, 84 So. 2d 700, 704-05 (Fla. 1956).
13. The statute correctly reads as follows:
It is provided also, That if any Serjeant, Pleader, or other, do any Manner of
Deceit or Collusion in the King's Court, or consent unto it, in Deceit of the
Court, or to beguile the Court, or the Party, and thereof be attainted, he shall be
imprisoned for a Year and a Day, and from thenceforth shall not be heard to
plead in that Court for any Man ....
Statute of Westminster, the First, 3 EDw. I, c. 29 (1275). See also Cohen, supra note 9,
at 479.
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Henry IV, c. 18."14 The court noted that this statute became effective in
Florida when the act of November 1829 was adopted, which declared
the common law and statutes of England of a general nature to July
4, 1776, to be of force in this state.1 5 In 1964,16 the court again relied
upon English history to support its power to discipline attorneys, setting
forth a brief history of the Inns of Court and the Benchers of the
Inns.1 As recently as July 1975,18 the court reaffirmed its exclusive
power to regulate the bar in a decision which held the Financial Dis-
closure Law19 inapplicable to officers of the court. The court noted
that the legislature has no constitutional power to adopt a code of
ethics designed to govern conduct of members of the judicial branch. 20
It is clear, then, that the authority of the Florida Supreme Court to
discipline those who practice before it is beyond dispute.
Historically, courts have asserted that the purpose of their authority
to discipline is not to punish the individual attorney, but to preserve
the purity of the bar and to protect the public from unscrupulous
practitioners. 21 It is against this background of power and purpose,
then, that the Moriber case rests. The court based its decision on two
distinct, but intertwined considerations: that the fee was "clearly ex-
cessive," and that it was based upon a contingency fee arrangement.
The Moriber court noted that there are few areas in attorney discipline
which are as subject to differing interpretation as the matter of what
constitutes excessive attorneys' fees.2 2 By its decision in Moriber, though,
14. Gould v. State, 127 So. 309, 311 (Fla. 1930). The Wolfe court noted that the
power to punish existed before there was a recognized class of attorneys, for the first roll
of attorneys was introduced by 4 Henry IV, c. 18. 12 Fla. at 283-84.
15. 127 So. at 311. The act of November 6, 1829, is codified as FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (1975).
16. The Florida Bar v. Massfeller, 170 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 1964).
17. As early as the 13th century there were organized in England the Inns of Court
which were voluntary non-corporate and self-governing legal societies. Then the
Benchers, who were senior members of the Inns, were entrusted with power to
discipline and even disbar a barrister guilty of misconduct. The Courts, as
successors to the "Benchers," have from time immemorial, both in England and in
this country, exercised as authority inherent in them, and without question, the
right and power to discipline members of the Bar practicing before them.
Id. at 838.
18. In re The Florida Bar, 316 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1975).
19. FLA. STAT. § 112.3145 (1975).
20. 316 So. 2d at 47.
21. See, e.g., Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1882); The Florida Bar v. Welch, 272
So. 2d 139 (Fla. 1972); The Florida Bar v. Loveland, 249 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 1971); The Florida
Bar v. King, 174 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 1965); State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Rubin, 142 So. 2d
65 (Fla. 1962); Gould v. State, 127 So. 309 (Fla. 1930). See also 7 AM. JUR. 2d Attorneys
at Law §§ 18, 25 (1963).
22. 314 So. 2d at 148. The relationship of money to systems of justice is an ancient
one, and is viewed with distaste. The Statute of Westminster, the First, stated:
And forasmuch as many complain themselves of Officers, Cryers of Fee, and the
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the court signaled its willingness to enforce DR 2-10623 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, adopted on June 3, 1970.24
Factors to be considered in determining an attorney's fee are con-
tained in DR 2-106(B)(1) -(8) of the Code.2 5 Using these guidelines,
the court found that Moriber's task was not difficult, did not present
a novel legal issue, involved very little expenditure of time, and in
fact "could have easily been performed by a layman. ' ' 26 Having made
these findings, the court, rather than declaring the fees to be clearly
Marshals of Justices in Eyre, taking Money wrongfully of such as recover Seisin of
Land, or of them that obtain their Suits, and of Fines levied, and of Jurors,
Towns, Prisoners, and of others attached upon Pleas of the Crown, otherwise
than they ought to do, in divers Manners; and forasmuch as there is greater
Number of them than there ought to be, whereby the People are sore grieved; The
King commandeth that such Things be no more done from henceforth; and if
any Officer of Fee doth it, his Office shall be taken into the King's Hand; and if
any of the Justices Marshals do it, they shall be grievously punished at the King's
Pleasure; and as well the one as the other shall pay unto the Complainants the
treble Value of that they have received in such manner.
Statute of Westminster, the First, 3 EDW. I, c. 30 (1275). See also Cohen, supra note 9,
at 479.
In England, the idea of compensation in connection with the workings of justice was
so distasteful that a barrister's fee was considered an honorarium. H. DRINKER, LEGAL
ETHics 169 (1953).
[I]n bygone times, when counsel met their clients at the pillars in St. Paul's and
round Doctors' Commons, the client used to deposit in the purse at the back of
the advocate's gown (theoretically without the latter's knowledge) whatever
honorarium he chose to mark thus delicately his sense of gratitude.
Id. at 169-70 n.5. It is interesting to note that in this often cited treatise the subject
is indexed under the word "compensation" rather than "fee."
23. THE FLORIDA BAR CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106, 32 FLA. STAT.
ANN. (Supp. 1975-76), provides:
(A) A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal
or clearly excessive fee.
(B) A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary
prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is in
excess of a reasonable fee.
24. In re Integration Rule of The Florida Bar, 235 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1970).
25. THE FLORIDA BAR CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(B), 32 FLA.
STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1975-76), provides:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the question in-
volved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing
the services.
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
26. 314 So. 2d at 148.
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excessive, stated: "The respondent's use of a contingent fee arrange-
ment under the circumstances of this case was manifestly improper. "27
This juxtaposition of the two separate factors of excessive fees and
contingency fees demonstrates their interrelationship in the court's
analysis.28
The history of the contingent fee is an unsavory one.2 9 In Florida,
early guidelines for attorneys' conduct in regard to contingent fees
were provided in Resolution XXIV of "Hoffman's Fifty Resolutions
in Regard to Professional Deportment," reproduced in the 1906 Year
Book of the Jacksonville Bar Association.3 0 The Resolution manages at
once to condemn contingency fee arrangements yet recognize their
necessity, 1 and reaches a tenuous ethical compromise relative to the
merits of compensation in the ratio of risk. 2
27. Id.
28. The identification of contingency fees with excessive fees demonstrates the re-
pugnance of the profession in general for the contingency fee arrangement. But so long
as contingency fees are not prohibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility, their
use should not be subject to indirect penalization.
Clearly a contingent fee and an excessive fee are not convertible terms and
there have been as many complaints of excessive fees which were not dependent
upon the result of litigation as of those which were so dependent.
Radin, Contingent Fees in California, 28 CAL. L. REv. 587, 591-92 (1940).
29. Champerty, as a species of maintenance, came to be applied to lawyers' contin-
gent fee contracts. The old identification with the transfer of a litigious right and the
assumption of expenses by the champertor was lost and champerty was soon. defined
as "the unlawful maintenance of a suit in consideration of some bargain to have
a part in dispute, or some profit out of it."
Comment, Lawyer's Tightrope-Use and Abuse of Fees, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 683, 686
(1956) (footnote omitted).
"[A]t the present time, in places where it [contingent fee] is not void, it is looked
upon with disfavor, not to say with contempt." Radin, supra note 28, at 587.
30. H. DRINKER, supra note 22, Appendix E.
31. I will never be tempted by any pecuniary advantage however great, nor be
persuaded by any appeal to my feelings however strong, to purchase, in whole or
in part my client's cause. . . . Cases may arise in which it would be mutually ad-
vantageous thus to bargain, but the experiment is too dangerous, and my rule too
sacred to admit of any exception, . . . better would it be that my client should
suffer, and I lose a great and honest advantage, than that any discretion should
exist in a matter so extremely liable to abuse, and so dangerous in precedent.
And though I have thus strongly worded my resolution, I do not thereby mean
to repudiate, as wholly inadmissible the taking of contingent fees-on the con-
trary, they are sometimes perfectly proper and are called for by public policy, no
less than by humanity.
id. at 343.
32. . . . I renew my resolution never so to purchase my client's cause, in whole or
in part; but still reserve to myself, on proper occasions, and with proper guards,
the professional privilege (denied by no law among us) of agreeing to receive a
contingent compensation . . ..
Id. at 344.
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The necessity of contingency fees33 was recognized by the American
Bar Association in 1908, when it modified proposed Canon 13 by
deleting the cautionary phrase that contingency fees "lead to many
abuses" and incorporating a provision that the purpose of the rule
was to protect clients from unjust charges.3 4 Ethical Consideration
2-20'5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility now provides the
guidelines for lawyers in Florida . 3
Florida case law is meager in the area of contingency fees. The
Florida courts have held that proper contracts for contingency fees will
generally be upheld.3 7 On the other hand, they have found a two-thirds
fee unconscionable, even where the possibility of successful outcome
was exceedingly unlikely,38 and have held contingency fee arrangements
in matters of matrimonial action to be against public policy.3 9 One re-
33. The case for and against a contingent fee, if we disregard considerations of his-
tory and what may be called snobbery, may be briefly summarized. The contingent
fee certainly increases the possibility that vexatious and unfounded suits will be
brought. On the other hand, it makes possible the enforcement of legitimate
claims which otherwise would be abandoned because of the poverty of the claimants.
Radin, supra note 28, at 589.
34. The text was changed from "13. Contingent Fees. Contingent fees lead to many
abuses, and where sanctioned by law should be under the supervision of the Court."
to "13. Contingent Fees. Contingent fees, where sanctioned by law, should be under
the supervision of the Court in order that clients may be protected from unjust
charges." 33 A.B.A. REP. 567, 579 (1908).
35. "The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and represent the
objectives toward which every member of the profession should strive."
THE FLORIDA BAR CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preliminary Statement, 32 FLA.
STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1975-76).
36. THE FLORIDA BAR CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-20, 32 FLA. STAT.
ANN. (Supp. 1975-76), provides:
Contingent fee arrangements in civil cases have long been commonly accepted in
the United States in proceedings to enforce claims. The historical bases of their
acceptance are that (1) they often, and in a variety of circumstances, provide the
only practical means by which one having a claim against another can economically
afford, finance, and obtain the services of a competent lawyer to prosecute his
claim, and (2) a successful prosecution of the claim produces a res out of which
the fee can be paid. Although a lawyer generally should decline to accept em-
ployment on a contingent fee basis by one who is able to pay a reasonable fixed fee,
it is not necessarily improper for a lawyer, where justified by the particular cir-
cumstances of a case, to enter into a contingent fee contract in a civil case with
any client who, after being fully informed of all relevant factors, desires that
arrangement.
37. The Florida Bar v. Moore, 194 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 1966) (where the court found
that the fee was not earned, rather than that the fee was excessive); Cone v. Benjamin,
27 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 1946); Johnston v. Cox, 154 So. 206 (Fla. 1934).
38. McCreary v. Joel, 186 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1966) (the court noted that the case was
not a disciplinary one).
39. Sobieski v. Maresco, 143 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1962). But contingency
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cent case, decided 9 months before Moriber by a district court
of appeal, is noteworthy for the rather startling conclusion that where
a client entered a contingency fee arrangement with attorneys to pursue
claims against her deceased grandfather's estate, and a will was later
discovered naming her the sole legatee, she was nonetheless responsible
to her counsel for sustaining the probate of the will, both in the trial
court and through appellate review. 40 Disputes involving the propriety
of contingency fees are decided on a case-by-case basis; therefore, exist-
ing case law provides few criteria for the practicing attorney.41
Case law on the issue of excessive fees is equally unproductive of
definitive standards due to the difficulty in separating aggravating cir-
cumstances from the offense of charging excessive fees. Unprofessional
conduct draws as much, if not more, judicial censure. For example, in
The Florida Bar v. Winn,42 an attorney charged a client (who earned
$14.26 a week) $3,500 for representing her in a divorce proceeding.
Additionally, the attorney failed to advise the courts of his client's
prior adjudication of incompetency. In The Florida Bar v. Scott,43 an
attorney paid himself a $2,000 fee from trust funds. A referee found
the fee was 10 times greater than the fee to which he was entitled.
The attorney also converted $6,401.84 of the trust funds, for which
he was convicted of grand larceny. The Winn and Scott cases exemplify
attorney conduct which Florida courts have found deserving of punish-
ment; they are illustrative of the difficulty involved in isolating the
elements of an attorney's offense.
44
The Moriber court turned from its brief, singular reference to
Moriber's contingency fee agreement with his client to address the
defenses raised to the charge of assessing excessive fees. Those de-
fenses were: (1) excessiveness could not be charged against Moriber
absent a showing of fraud or dishonesty; (2) his client had requested
that the matter be kept strictly confidential; and (3) his client was fully
fee contracts are enforceable when they relate to return of separate property of a
spouse. Salter v. St. Jean, 170 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
40. Lungu v. Horton, 298 So. 2d 423, 424 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
41. A petition by the Florida Bar to amend Disciplinary Rules 2-106(B) and 2-107
was filed with the supreme court on November 18, 1975. This petition seeks extensive
modification of the rules governing contingency fees. The amended rules would provide
for fixed maximum percentages of recovery which may be charged by an attorney; that
contingency fee contracts must be in writing; and that contracts which exceed the
standards without judicial permission will be presumed to be clearly excessive. If the
petition is granted, equivocal treatment of contingency fees will be moderated. In re
The Florida Bar, No. 48,384 (Fla. Nov. 18, 1975).
42. 208 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 1968).
43. 227 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1969).
44. See note 51 and accompanying text infra.
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aware of the terms of the contingency fee arrangement. 45 Moriber did
not raise as a defense the required standard of clear and convincing
proof, though such a defense has been successfully used in disciplinary
cases.46
Countering Moriber's first defense, the court quoted the provisions
of Rule 11.02(4) of the Integration Rule of the Florida Bar: " '... Con-
troversies as to the amount of fees are not grounds for disciplinary
proceedings unless the amount demanded is clearly excessive, extortion-
ate or the demand is fraudulent.' "47 The words "clearly excessive" were
added to the rule to comport with the change in DR 2-106 promul-
gated by the American Bar Association on August 12, 1969.48 Neither
the brief of the Florida Bar nor the brief of Moriber contained cita-
tion to any case directly on point, for the simple reason that there
are no cases. 49 As the law stood before the adoption by the American
Bar Association of the Code of Professional Responsibility, an excessive
fee was generally regarded as insufficient to warrant disciplinary action
unless there were other factors coupled with it.5° But charging a fee
45. 314 So. 2d at 148, 149.
46. The Florida Bar v. Quick, 279 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1973) (clear and convincing
evidence necessary); The Florida Bar v. Schonbrun, 257 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1971) (referee's
finding was not supported by clear and convincing proof); The Florida Bar v. Rayman,
238 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1970) (quantum of proof necessary to disbar need not be beyond and
to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt, but clear and convincing). The defense was
unsuccessfully asserted in The Florida Bar v. Welch, 272 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 1972).
47. 314 So. 2d at 148.
48. The Florida Supreme Court, on June 3, 1970, adopted a Code of Professional
Responsibility which is substantially identical to that of the American Bar Association.
235 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1970).
49. The cases relied on by Moriber were from other jurisdictions and were not
recent decisions. They were: United States v. Stringer, 124 F. Supp. 705 (D. Alas.
1954) (excessive fee generally regarded as insufficient to warrant disciplinary action unless
there are other factors); Herrscher v. State Bar of California, 49 P.2d 832 (Cal. 1935) (ex-
cessive fee will not of itself warrant discipline without the presence of fraud, overreaching,
or failure to disclose true facts to client); People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Green,
187 N.E. 811 (Ill. 1933) (there is no exact standard for fixing fees; absent willful over-
reaching, an attorney should not be condemned); Swanson v. Hempstead, 149 P.2d 404
(Cal. Ct. App. 1944) (whether a contingent fee contract is unconscionable is to be deter-
mined by the facts existing at the time the contract was entered into). The Florida Bar
acknowledged the lack of precedent: "This case is unique because it lacks many such
aggravating factors [fraud or dishonesty] typically found in excessive fee cases in other
jurisdictions." Brief of Complainant at 5, The Florida Bar v. Moriber, 314 So. 2d 145
(Fla. 1975).
50. United States v. Stringer, 124 F. Supp. 705 (D. Alas. 1954) (see note 49 supra);
Ex parte Goodman, 37 N.E.2d 345 (Ill. 1941) (grossly excessive charges accompanied by
indefensible acts to coerce payment); In re Myrland, 95 P.2d 56 (Ariz. 1939) (discipline
is proper where fee is so excessive and unconscionable that it could not have been
charged in good faith); In re Quinn, 135 A.2d 869 (N.J. 1957) (the touchstone for de-
termining if fee is sufficiently excessive to require discipline is moral turpitude); Haun-
stein v. State Bar of Oklahoma, 46 P.2d 558 (Okla. 1935) (where attorney was not guilty
1976]
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grossly disproportionate to the services performed was misconduct
that warranted disciplinary action, in the absence of contingencies
justifying a large fee.51 The former proposition had the greater support
of Florida case law for those incidents occurring prior to 1970.52 A
trend towards the latter proposition was signaled in a 197353 case
involving incidents occurring in 1969. The court based its decision
on former Rule 11.02(4), but noted that future cases would be governed
by the amended rule which provides for discipline for excessive fees.
The Moriber decision clearly demonstrates the court's willingness to
enforce this provision of DR 2-106. As discussed below, however, the
court may continue to apply the conservative standards of the past.
The court gave scant consideration to the second defense proffered
by Moriber, i.e., the degree of secrecy demanded by his client. The
court noted there is no connection between the strict confidence re-
quired of every attorney-client relationship and the amount of fee
which may be charged.
4
Moriber's third defense was that his client was fully informed of
the terms of the agreement, entered willingly into the contract, and
therefore the court was without power to interfere in the contractual
relationship. In addressing this defense, the court used language similar
to that of the Supreme Court of California in the 1931 benchmark case
of fraud or deception of client, excessive fee was not grounds for disbarment).
51. Bushman v. State Bar of California, 522 P.2d 312 (Cal. 1974) (see note 52 and
accompanying text infra); In re Cary, 177 N.W. 801 (Minn. 1920) (fee so excessive in com-
parison with services rendered as to demonstrate a person of greed who should not be
allowed to bargain for professional fees); In re Loring, 301 A.2d 721 (N.J. 1973) (discipline
is called for if fee is so excessive as to evidence an attempt to overreach the client); State
ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Richards, 84 N.W.2d 136 (Neb. 1957) (charging of
"clearly" excessive fee is ground for suspension or disbarment).
52. The Florida Bar v. Welch, 272 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 1972) (attorney exerted undue in-
fluence on mentally disoriented client to obtain execution of the deed to her $14,000
homestead to his wife for $700 consideration); The Florida Bar v. Britton, 255 So. 2d
525 (Fla. 1971) (attorney received double compensation for services in divorce case; her
truculence, professional misconduct and improper solicitation were considered by the
court in its entry of a public reprimand); The Florida Bar v. Scott, 227 So. 2d 195 (Fla.
1969) (attorney who paid himself from trust funds a fee 10 times greater than he was
entitled to, and converted trust funds to his own use, for which he was convicted of
grand larceny, disbarred); The Florida Bar v. Rodriguez, 226 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 1969) (at-
torney whose acceptance of fees was accompanied by unprofessional conduct and mis-
handling of trust funds suspended for 2 years); The Florida Bar v. Winn, 208 So. 2d
809 (Fla. 1968) (attorney suspended for 6 months for charging client who had been
adjudged incompetent and who earned $14.26 per week, $3,500 for unproductive and
ill-considered litigation; and charging another client a 50% contingency fee for property
recovered for client-defendant in a divorce case, where plaintiff-husband died prior to
the divorce and the property passed by operation of law).
53. The Florida Bar v. Quick, 279 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1973).
54. 314 So. 2d at 149.
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of Goldstone v. State Bar,55 stating: "an attorney may still be disciplined
for overreaching where the fees charged are grossly disproportionate to
the services rendered. '" '16 The test of Goldstone, still followed by the
California Supreme Court, is "whether the fee is 'so exorbitant and
wholly disproportionate to the services performed as to shock the
conscience.' "51 It is curious that the Florida Supreme Court chose to use
the standards that existed prior to 1970, rather than the express language
of the present rule, to overcome Moriber's defense that the client
willingly accepted the terms of the fee contract. Disciplinary Rule
2-106(A) clearly states: "A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for,
charge, or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee";58 it is obvious
that the rule contemplates proscription of overreaching at the con-
tracting as well as at the collecting stage. The court did not, however,
rely upon this language of the rule; therefore, it must in a later case
clarify the standards which it will utilize.
Having determined that the fee was "clearly excessive ' ' 5 9 in viola-
tion of DR 2-106, the court proceeded to a determination of the ap-
propriate discipline. The assessment of discipline is solely within the
discretion of the court,60 its only guidelines being "the basic principles
embodied in the Canons and in the objectives reflected in the Ethical
Considerations" ;61 "a standard of conscience . . . not according to
technical rules. ' ' 62 Although the avowed purpose of attorney discipline
is not punishment, but the protection of society, 63 and "neither pre-
judice nor passion should enter into determination, ' ' 64 there is un-
deniably an element of retribution in disciplinary proceedings.
The court noted Moriber's "patent disregard for applicable rules
55. 6 P.2d 513, 516 (Cal. 1931).
56. 314 So. 2d at 149.
57. Bushman v. State Bar of California, 522 P.2d 312, 314 (Cal. 1974).
58. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 23 (emphasis added).
59. The court emphasized its decision by utilizing formal language: "We hold" the
fee to be "clearly excessive." 314 So. 2d at 149.
60. See note 8 supra.
61. THE FLORIDA BAR CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preliminary Statement,
32 FLA. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1975-76):
The Code makes no attempt to prescribe either disciplinary procedures or penalties
for violation of a Disciplinary Rule, nor does it undertake to define standards for
civil liability of lawyers for professional conduct. The severity of judgment against
one found guilty of violating a Disciplinary Rule should be determined by the
character of the offense and the attendant circumstances. An enforcing agency, in
applying the Disciplinary Rules, may find interpretative guidance in the basic
principles embodied in the Canons and in the objectives reflected in the Ethical
Considerations.
62. 127 So. at 310-11.
63. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
64. The Florida Bar v. Thomson, 271 So. 2d 758, 761 (Fla, 1972).
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of professional ethics as well as his own promise given under oath to
reimburse his client" as an aggravating factor.65 It then cited the case
of The Florida Bar v. Winn,6 6 in which the court had suspended an
attorney for 6 months "[o]n facts scarcely more aggravating than
those presented here. ''6 7 Although Moriber had practiced in Florida
since 1953 with "no prior disciplinary punishments," 68 it is clear that
the court considered Moriber's unrepentant attitude a severely ag-
gravating factor which weighed in its decision to suspend him from
the practice of law for 45 days, his reinstatement conditioned upon
restitution of the excessive portion of the fee.
In Moriber, the Supreme Court of Florida, although censuring an
attorney for clearly excessive fees, indicated an unwillingness to re-
linquish the old standards of judging fees to be excessive, and will prob-
ably continue to punish only those who charge fees which "shock the
conscience" of the court.
CAROL ANN TURNER
Constitutional Law-DUE PROCESS-GEORGIA PREJUDGMENT GARNISH-
MENT PROCEDURES INVALID.-North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem,
Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
On August 20, 1973, plaintiff Di-Chem, Inc. filed suit in the superior
court of Whitfield County, Georgia, alleging that defendant North
Georgia Finishing, Inc. owed it $51,279.17 for goods sold and delivered.
Simultaneously, Di-Chem filed affidavit and bond for process of garnish-
ment,1 asserting that it had "reason to apprehend the loss of said sum
65. 314 So. 2d at 149. The fact that Moriber knew at the time the contract was
executed that Pietz was the sole beneficiary of approximately $20,000 in trust funds was
specifically noted by the court. Id. at 146.
66. 208 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 1968).
67. The facts which the court considered "scarcely more aggravating" are set out in
note 52 supra.
68. 314 So. 2d at 148.
1. The procedural prerequisites to obtaining a writ of garnishment in Georgia are
governed by GA. CODE ANN. § 46 (1974); the statute provides exemptions for wages. GA.
CODE ANN. § 46-101 (1974). It requires that the plaintiff sign an affidavit before some
officer authorized to issue an attachment or the clerk of any record court, stating the
amount claimed due, the apprehension of loss of all or part of the amount claimed
due, and postage of a double bond. GA. CODE ANN, § 46-102 (1974). The affidavit may be
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